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According to a recent decision of the Circuit Court for the
Southern District of California, a suit in a state court cannot
be pleaded in abatement of a suit as to the same
Abatement,
Lis Pendens, matter in a federal court; but when a state court
State and
Federal

Courts

has first taken cognizance of a cause of which
that court and the federal court have concur-

rent jurisdiction, the federal court, on motion, will dismiss a
suit brought in it as to the same matter, or will suspend proceedings therein until the final action of the state court:
Gamble v. City of San Diego, 79 Fed. Rep. 487.
This rule is by no means as well settled as the court supposes. The cases cited as authority for the ruling are almost
all cases in which the state and the federal court did not have
the same territorial jurisdiction, and hence came within the
settled rule, that a suit pending in a foreign court cannot be
pleaded in abatement: Maule v. Murray, 7 T. R. 470, 1798;
Wilson v. Ferrand,13 L. R. Eq. 362, 1871 ; Buchner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 586, 1829; Humphrzes v. Dawson, 38 Ala. 199,
1861; Griderv. Afferson, 32 Ark. 332, 1877 ; Hatcl v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485, 1853; JcJilton v. Love, 13 Ill. 486,
1851 DeArmond v. Bohn, 12 Ind. 607, 1859; Davis v. Mortor-, 4 Bush. (Ky.), 442, 1868; Seevers v. Clements, 28 Md.
426, 1867; Newell v. Newton, io Pick. (Mass.) 470, 1830;
Goodell v. Marshall, i i N. H. 88, 184o; Bonner v. Joy, 9
Johns. (N. Y.) 221, 1812; Walsh v. Durkin, 12 Johns. (N. Y.)
99, 1815 ; Lowry v. Hall, 2 W. & S. (Pa.) 129, 1841; Smith
v. Lathrop, 44 Pa. 326, 1863; O'Reilly v. N. Y. & N. E.R. R.
.Co., 16 R. I. 388, 1889; Drake v. Brander, 8 Tex. 351, 1852.
But while there is hardly a dissenting voice to the proposition that a suit in a state court outside of the territorial jurisdiction of a federal court is no ground for abating a suit in
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the latter, and vice versa: Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548,
1876; Ins. Co. v. Brune, 96 U. S. 588, 1877; Cook v. Litchfield, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 330, 1851; the question whether a
suit in a state court may be pleaded in abatement of a suit in
a federal court of the same territorial jurisdiction, as in this
case, is still undecided, the authorities pro and con being
nearly equally balanced, and the Supreme Court not yet
having pronounced upon it. In favor of the validity of such
a plea are: Earl v. Raymond, 4 McLean, (U. S.) 233, 1847;
Brooks v. Mills Co., 4 Dill. (U. S.) 524, 1848 ; Presbyterian
Church v. White, (U. S.) 4 Am. L. REG. 526, 1856; Nelson v.
Foster, 5 Biss. (U. S.) 44, 1857; Smith v. Att. Fire Ins. Co.,
22 N. H. 21, 185o; Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J. v. N. J. West Line
R.R. Co., 32 N.J. Eq. 67, 188o; Mitchellv. Bunch, 2 Paige Ch.
(N. Y.) 6o6, 1831.' Opposed to it are: Wadleigh v. Veazie, 3
Sumn. (U. S.) 165, 1838; White v. Whitman, I Curt. (U. S.)
494, 1853; Loring v. Marsh1, 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 3 11, 1864; Parsons v. Greenville & Columbia R. R. Co., I Hughes, (U. S.)
279, 1876; New England Screw Co. v. Blivan, 3 B!atchf.
(U. S.) 240, 1854; In re Brinninger, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 168,
1870; Ranitzer v. Wyatt, 4o Fed. Rep. 609, 1889; State v.
N. 0.& N. E. R. R. Co., 42 La. An. II, 189o; Wood vLake, 13 Wis. 84, 186o.
The reader may take his choice.
The Supreme Coourt of Iowa, following its former decision
in Opel v. Shoup, 69 N. W. Rep. 56o, has lately held, that a
of the United States with a foreign country
treaty
Aliens,
providing that aliens may inherit lands is controlRght to
ling, and confers that right upon them, though
Trheit,
Conflict of
Laws

the laws of the state may provide otherwise:
Doehrel v. Hillner, 71 N. W. Rep. 2o4, and that,

by the treaty between the King of Prussia and the prince of
Waldeck, the citizens of Waldeck became subjects of the King
of Prussia, and consequently entitled to the benefits of the
treaty between the United States and Prussia governing the
rights of inheritance of citizens of the respective countries:
Wilcke v. Wilcke, 71 N. W. Rep. 2o.
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There is a note on this subject in the March number of
this magazine: 36 AMi. L. REG. & REv. N. S. 187 (1897).
The Court of Appeals of New York has recently held,
affirming 41 N. Y. SuppI. 1112, that upon a proceeding for
Attorney-at, the disbarment of an attorney, the fact that some
Law,
of the charges of professional misconduct brought
Disbarment,
Suspension of

Proceedings

against him are such as also to involve liability
to a criminal prosecution, does not entitle the

respondent to a suspension of proceedings until he has had
the opportunity for a jury trial upon those charges : Rochester
Bar Association v. Dortky, (Court of Appeals of New York,)
46 N. E. Rep. 835, affirming 41 N. Y. Suppl. 1112.
When it is stipulated in a building contract for the execution of specified works that it shall be completed by a certain
day, and in default of completion, the contractor
Building
Contract,
shall be liable to pay the liquidated damages, and
Liquidated
Damages,
Penalties for
Delay,
Extras

there is also a provision that other work may be
ordered by way of addition to the contract, and

additional work is ordered which nececssarily
delays the completion of the work, the contractor is exonerated
from liability to pay the liquidated damages, unless by the
terms of the contract he has agreed that, whatever additional
work may be ordered, he will nevertheless complete the works
within the time originally limited: Dodd v. Chustron, [1897]
x Q. B. 562.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, Hoopes v. De Vaughan, 27 S. E.
Cancellation, Rep. 25 1, a suit in equity to annul a forged deed
ForgedDeed, of land and have it cancelled, and the record of
Equity
Jurisdiction

it declared void, brought by the legal owner of the
land, who is the grantor named in the forged deed, or the
party holding title from that grantor, who instituted suit to
annul the deed while he is out of possession, is not taken out
of the jurisdiction of equity by the fact that the deed is void,
and it is not necessary that the legal owner before bringing
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suit should establish his title and obtain possession of the
land by ejectment at law.
The Circuit Court for the Southern District of -Ohio,
(W. D.,) in Voight v. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. Ry. Co.,
79 Fed. Rep. 561, has lately held, that while a
Carriers
railroad company is under no obligation to carry
Railroads,
Express
an express messenger
as such, yet when under
Z
Messenger,
Uintitation of such a contract with the express company it does
Liability
carry him, it is acting as a common carrier of per-sons, and he does not lose his rights and character as a passenger because he travels in a special car provided by the express
,company; and consequently a contract by which an express
messenger so carried in a special car agrees not to hold the
railroad company liable for injury to him caused by the negligence of the company or its servants is void, as against public
policy. (See note in this number.)
The Court of Appeals of New York has recently decided,
by a bare majority, that when the mayor of a city has classiCivil .Service,

fied the positions in the civil service of the city,

Competitive

pursuant to the civil service law, and has deter-

Examina.
tions,
When not
Required

mined that no examinations shall be required for

certain positions, his action, until judicially determined to be erroneous, is binding upon the

courts, and is a protection to the subordinate heads of departments in making appointments, and to the employes: Chitxtenden v. Wurster, 46 N. E. Rep. 857.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
lately held, following Dennick v. R. R. Co., 103 U. S. I I, that
Conflict

a right of action given by the statutes of Canada

'of Laws,
Death by
kNegligence

to the widow and children of one who has been
killed in that country through
Z the negligence of
another, may be prosecuted to
judgment by them

in the courts of the United States, though the statute of the
state within whose territory suit is brought (here Vermont)
gives the right of action to the personal representatives of the
deceased: Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. MIcDffey, 79 Fed.
Rep. 934.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

In Re Chapman, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 677, the Supreme Court
of the United States has settled some vexed questions of law,
Constitutional which have been prominently before the public for
Law,
Construction

sometime past, growing out of the investigation
by the Senate into the truth of the charges that

of Act,

Investigating
some of its members had been dealing in the stock
Committees,
Jurisdiction,

of the American Sugar Refining Company, the

Unreasonable
Searches,
Twice in
Jeopardy

value of which was likely to be much affected by
the pending tariff bill. It holds, (I) That Rev.
Stat. U. S. § 102, which makes it a misdemeanor,

punishable by indictment in the Criminal Court of the District
of Columbia, for any witness summoned by authority of either
house of Congress to give testimony or produce papers upon
"any matter under inquiry," before either house or any committee thereof, to make default, or refuse to answer, is not so
connected with section to3, which declares that such witnesses
are not privileged to refuse to give testimony on the ground
that it may tend to disgrace or render them infamous, that, if
the latter section should be held unconstitutional, the former
must fall with it; (2) That the act is not unconstitutional on
the ground that it delegates to the Criminal Court of the
District of Columbia exclusive jurisdiction in such cases, and
thereby deprives the houses of their constitutional right to
punish the witness for contempt, or on the ground that, if the
houses still retain their authority in that regard, the witness
would be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; since
indictable statutory offences may be punished as such, while
the offenders may likewise be subjected to punishment for the
same acts as a contempt; (3) That the words "any matter of
inquiry," used in § 102, are to be construed as meaning any
matters within the jurisdiction of the two houses which are
before them for consideration, and proper for their action, and
any questions pertinent thereto or facts or papers bearing
thereon; (4) That within the meaning of this section, the
senate had jurisdiction to enter upon an inquiry in respect of
the truth of charges in the newspapers as to alleged dealings
of senators in the stock of the American Sugar Refining Company, thereby impugning the integrity and purity of such
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members in a manner calculated to destroy public confidence
in that body, and to subject the individuals to censure or
expulsion ; and that it was not essential to the jurisdiction that
the preamble and resolution authorizing the investigation
should state that the proceeding was taken for the purpose of
censure or expulsion; and (5) That in such a case it is no
invasion of the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures to require a member of a stock brokerage firm to state whether or not any senator had bought or
sold such stock through his firm.
The same court has also declared that a city ordinance
which provides that no one shall make a public address in any
Freedom of of the public grounds of the city, "except in
Speech
accordance with a permit from the mayor," is not
an interference with the right to freedom of speech, and does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment: Davis v. Commonwealti of Afassachzusetts, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 731. See note in
this number.
A court of equity has undoubted jurisdiction to commit for
contempt a person not included in an injunction, nor a party
to the action, who, knowing of the injunction, aids
Contempt,
and abets a defendant in committing a breach of
Injunction
it: Seaward v. Paterson, (Supreme Court of Judicature, Court
of Appeal,) [1897] i Ch. 545.

The West Publishing Company has at last secured a victory
in its litigation with the Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing
Company, the Circuit Court of Appeals holding
Copyright,
Law Reports, that the evidence indicated a general systematic,
Infringement and widespread unfair use of the copyrighted
work of the complainant on the part of the editors who
prepared over 6,ooo of the syllabi for the cases digested from
the complainant's series of reports, and that the entire work
should therefore be enjoined, excepting the paragraphs digested from original sources, with the privilege, however, to
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the defendant, to show by competent proof which paragraphswere prepared by the two editors found by the court not to,
have offended, and to move to have these paragraphs excepted&
from the injunction: West Pub. Co. v. Lawyers' Co-op. Pub.
Co., 79 Fed. Rep. 756, reversing 64 Fed. 36o.
The principal points of law decided were, that a copyrighted
syllabus to a legal opinion may be infringed without reproducing the original language; and that when the material evidence
conclusively shows that a subsequent digester has made an
unfair use of any part of a syllabus prepared by his predecessor, the presumption is that he made use of the whole.
syllabus, and the burden of proof lies upon him to prove that
he did not do so.
In a case recently before the Court of Errors and Appeals.
of New Jersey, Taylor v. Wands, 37 Atl. Rep. 315, a married,
Corporations, woman united with her two sons and her insolFormation,
vent husband in the formation of a trading corpoFraud on
Creditors,
ration, and she and her sons took all the stock
issued, except one share, which was allotted to thehusband, without payment. The
money paid in.
by her on her shares was her own. Her husband was employed as president and manager of the corporation, upon a
salary not shown to be unreasonable. There was no sufficient
proof that the arrangement was devised to cover from his
creditors any property of his. Under these circumstances, it
was held, that since, in New Jersey, a married woman may
embark her own money and capital in any separate business.
or trade, may employ agents to carry on that business, and,
may avail herself of their skill and ability to make it successful, she may employ her insolvent husband as such an agent,.
if she does so in good faith, and the profits and earnings of thebusiness will belong to her, though they are partly due to his
business ability, experience and energy; and therefore, in the
case in hand, the undivided earnings of the corporation, represented by the wife's shares of stock, belonged to her, though
due in part to the skillful management of the business of the:
corporation by her husband.
Married
Women
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The Supreme Court of Alabama has recently decided, that
a sole stockholder (a corporation), which, by vote of the stock,
Sole Owner of authorized, for its individual benefit, the issue of
bonds secured by trust deed of the property of the
Stock,
corporation, and thereby impaired the value of the
Powers
stock, could not, for its own acts, avoid the bonds in the hands
of purchasers ; and though these acts of the stockholder were
in favor of its own bondholders, for whose benefit it had previously mortgaged the stock, reserving the legal title and the
right to vote the stock until default, a purchaser of the stock
on foreclosure of the mortgage, who obtained a perfect title
thereto, took none of the equities of the bondholders, and
hence could not attach the bonds, except in the name of the
corporation, and subject to the disability of the original stockholder: McCaleb v. Goodwin, 21 So. Rep. 967.
The fact that one person becomes the owner of a majority
or all of the shares of stock of a corporation, does not work a
Ownership of dissolution of the corporation, nor necessarily
destroy its identity as a business concern, and
Stock by
One Person, property conveyed to such a corporation does not
Effect

become the individual property of the stockholder:
Harrington v. Conway, (Supreme Court of Nebraska,) 70 N.
W. Rep. 911.
A corporation is not dissolved by the concentration of its
stock in the hands of one person : Newton .7ffg. Co. v. White,
42 Ga. 148, 1871 : State v. Vincennes Univ., 5 Ind. 77, 1854;
Louisville Bkg. Co. v. Eiseinnon, 94 Ky. 83, 1894; Russell v.
ZcTellan, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 63, 1833; Wilde v. Jenkins, 4
Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 481, 1834; Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20,
1884; but see Swift v. Smitlz, 65 Md. 428, 1886. It remains
a going concern, and the sole stockholder cannot bind it by a
contract made in his own name: Allemong v. Simmins, 124
Ind. 199, 189o; Donoghue v. Indiana & L. l. Ry. Co., 87
Mich. 13, 189 1; or transfer the legal title to its property bya
conveyance in his own name; or bind it by a mortgage:
Baldwcin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1879; Frank v. Drenkbrahm, 76 Mo. 508, 1882; Bundy v. Iron Co., 38 Ohio St.
300, 1882; Parkerv. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 1896;
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Wheelock v. A oulton, 15 Vt. 519, 1843; Stewart v. Gould, 8
Wash. 367, 1894; ilhirp/j, v. Hanrakan, 50 Wis. 485, i88o;
Button v. Hoffinan, (supra); or sue in his own name on
a course of action belonging to it: Fitzgerald v. 31o. Pac.
Ry. Co., 45 Fed. Rep. 812, 1891 ; Randall v. Dudley, (Mich.)
69 N. W. Rep. 729, 1897.
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that
the property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature;
and it is within the.discretion of the legislature
Dogs,
Property in, to say how far they shall be recognized as propPolice Power

erty and under what restrictions they shall be

permitted to roam the street; but even if they were property
in the fullest sense they would still be subject to the police
power of the state, and might be destroyed or otherwise dealt
with, as in the judgment of the legislature is necessary for
the protection of its citizens; and that a state statute, (Rev.
Stat. La. § 1201, as amended July 5, 1882,) which provided
that no dog shall be entitled to the protection of the law,
unless placed upon the assessment rolls, and limits the recovery by the owner for the killing or injury of a dog to the
value fixed by himself for purposes of taxation, is a valid
exercise of the police power: Sentell v. New Orleans & C.
R. R. Co., 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693.
It is not contributory negligence in the owner of property to
attempt to remove a broken live electric light wire
Electric
Light Wires, lIn upnhsprmssi
Contributory ying upon his premises, in such a condition as to
Negligence
endanger his property, although it is emitting
sparks and a blaze of electric light: Leavenwortht Coal Co. v.
Batchford, (Court of Appeals of Kansas, Northern Dept.,
E. D.,) 48 Pac. Rep. 927.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has lately
held that an electric street railway line has no right to the
Electric
use of the street as a highway superior to that of
Riroads,

Right to Use a person driving on the highway; and therefore,
of Street, when a driver of a wagon is on the wrong side
Contributory

Negligence of a street, on the track of an electric car which
is approaching him, and knows that another car is approach-
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ing from behind, and that it is so far away that, if it goes at
its ordinary rate of speed, he can safely cross to that side of
the street, he is not negligent in so doing, and in assuming
that the car would not be run at a dangerous rate of speed:
Lalffer v. Bridgeport Traction Co., 37 Atl. Rep. 379.
When the assignee for creditors of a mortgagor, by delaying to question the validity of a pledge of bonds secured by
the mortgage for over eight years after it was
Estoppel,
Preferenceof made, and by treating it as valid led the pledgee
Creditors
to rely entirely on his security, and to forbear to
prosecute his action on the original debt, which had become
barred in the meantime by the statute of limitations, he cannot avoid the pledge as a preference: Elt v. Sears Commercial
Co., (Supreme Court of Rhode Island,) 37 Atl. Rep. 3 11 .
When the indictment or affidavit, a copy of which is attached to a requisition for the return of a fugitive
Interstate, from justice would be held sufficient by the courts

Extradition,

Sufficiency of
Affidavit

of the state where the offense was committed, the
requisition must be granted, though the indictment or affidavit
would not be held good by the courts of the state of asylum :
Webb v. York, (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,) 79
Fed. Rep. 616.
The Circuit Court for the Northern District of Texas has recently decided that while the general rule is that persons prosecuted in state courts will not be released by the
Habeas
Corpus,
federal courts on habeas corpits, but will be left to
Jurisdiction of
Federal over
State Courts

reach the Supreme Court of the United States by
writ of error, yet the federal courts have power

to issue the writ when special circumstances require, possessing a discretion which must be governed by the facts of each
case: Inz re Grice, 79 Fed. Rep. 627.
The controlling facts which moved the court to interfere in
this case were, that the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
had intimated that it considered the statute (the Texas antitrust law of 1889,) under which the petitioner was indicted
constitutional, whereas the circuit court held it clearly uncon-
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stitutional on several grounds; and that the statute prevented
the petitioner from giving bond after conviction, and compelled
him to submit to imprisonment during the time required for an
appeal to the court of criminal appeals, and from there to the
Supreme Court of the United States; together with several
minor circumstances, such as the ruling of the trial judge in a
similar case, and the delay in trying the petitioner.
The married women's acts have only increased the rights of
the wife, not abridged those of the husband, except as to his
Husband and control over her property; and an action by a
Wife,
husband for the loss of consortium, caused by
Injury to Wife.,
Action by
Husband

injuries to his wife through the negligence of the
defendant, will still lie, though the wife has already

recovered in her own right for the injuries received: Kelly v.
N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., (Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts,) 46 N. E. Rep. lO63.
A conveyance of his property by a husband will not be set
aside at the suit of the wife as fraudulent, on the ground that
Divorce,
it was made to defeat her right to attach the
Alimony,
property to secure a contingent claim for alimony
Fraudulent
Conveyance

in a suit for divorce which she had threatened to
bring in the absence of any showing that she had cause for
divorce and alimony, or even brought, or attempted to bring,
[or intended bona fide to bring ?] any such action: Ullrich v.
Ullril, (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,) 37 Atl.
Rep. 393.
The Supreme Court of Washington has lately held in accordance with the general current of opinion, that when a
Injunction to

candidate for office has duly qualified, and is in

Prevent
Deforcement
of Office

possession of his office under a certificate of election issued by the proper officer, and regular on

its face, equity will protect him by injunction in
the enjoyment of the office, and the exercise of its duties,
without interference by others, until the title to the office can
be adjudicated: State v. Superior Court of Snohomisl Co., 48
Pac. Rep. 741.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland has decided, that when
the transaction out of which an alleged debt arose occurred in
Maryland, being within the statute prohibiting
Injunction,
Suit in
gambling, and both parties were citizens and
Foreign Court residents of that state, a court of equity in Maryland would restrain the creditor from proceeding against the
debtor in another state, to which he had resorted to evade the
Maryland laws prohibiting imprisonment for debt, the means
which the foreign court would have for ascertaining the statute
on which the debtor relied to avoid the transactions being
imperfect, and the procuring of evidence being difficult and
expensive: Miller v. Gittings, 37 Atl. Rep. 372.
Since a court of equity acts in personam, it may restrain a
person within its jurisdiction from prosecuting a suit, whether
at law or in equity, in a foreign court, upon a showing of facts
sufficient to invoke its jurisdiction: Pickett v. Ferguson, 45
Ark. 177,

1885 ; Engel v. Schenerman, 4o Ga. 2o6, 1869 ;

Cole v. Young, 24 Kan. 435, i88o; Great Falls Mfg. Co. v.
Worster, 23 N. H. 462, 1851; Hayes v. Ward, 4 Johns. Ch.
(N. Y.) 123, 1819 ; Vermont & Canada R. R. Co. v. Vermont
Central R. R. Co., 46 Vt. 792, 1873. This power is most
frequently exercised to restrain attempts to evade the laws of the
state of the party's domicile, e. g., to attach property exempt
by those laws: Allen v. Buchanan, 97 Ala. 399, 1892 ; Wilson
v.Joseph, 107 Ind. 490, 1886; Zimmerman v. Franke, 34 Kan.
65o, 1886; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203, 1877; Snook v.
Suetzer, 25 Ohio St. 5 16, 1874; Griggs v. Doeter, 89 Wis.
161, 1895 ; and to elude the operation of the insolvent laws:
Dehon v. Foster,4 Allen, (Mass.) 545, 1862 ; Dehon v. Foster,
7 Allen, (Mass.) 57, 1863 ; Cunninglam v. Butler, 142 Mass.
47, 1886; or to vexatious suit, or multiplicity of actions:
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kertman, 54 Fed. Rep. 547, 1892;
Lawrence v. Manning, 9 N. Y. Suppl. 223, 1890; Cuthbert v.
Chanoet, 14 N. Y. Suppl. 62, 365, 1891; Norfolk & N. B.
Hosiery Co. v. Arnold, 143 N. Y. 265, 1894. But an injunction will not be granted for this purpose, if the complainant
has an adequate defence at law: Attalla Wire & Mfg. Co. v.
Winchester, 102 Ala. 184, 1893; Met. Lfe Ins. Co. v. Fuller,
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61 Conn. 252, 1891 ; Alleyv. Clhase, 83 Me. 537, 1891 ;Jordan
v. Clase, 83 Me. 540, 1891; Baxter v. Baxter, 77 N. C. i 18,

1877 ; or because the complainant prefers to try the matter in
the courts of his own state: Cole v. Young, 24 Kans. 435,
i88o; Carson v. Dunhzam, 149 Mass. 52, 1889; Bank of
Bellows Falls v. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co., 28 Vt. 470,
1856. In New York, and some other states, it is held that,
from principles of comity, a suit in a foreign court should
never be restrained, except in very special cases: Harrisv.
Pullman, 84 Ill. 20, 1876 ; Thorndike v. Thorndike, 142 Ill.
450, 1892 ; Meadv. Merritt, 2 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 402, 1831 ;
Williams v. Ayrault, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 364, 186o. But if such
a case arises, relief will be afforded: Prudell v. Quinn, 7 Ill.
App.-6o5, 188o; Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156, 1854;
affirming I Duer, (N. Y.) 142, 1852; Vail v.iKnapp, 49 Barb.
(N. Y.) 299, 1867; Dinsmore v. Neresheimer, 32 Hun, (N. Y.)
204, 1884.

As a general rule, the federal courts will not enjoin the
prosecution of a suit in a state court, being prohibited by
statute: Rev. Stat. U. S. § 720; Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cr. 179,
1807; Dillon v. Ry. Co., 43 Fed. Rep. lO9, 189o; Haines v.
Carpenter, 91 U. S. 254, 1875; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S.
340, 1877; The Mamie, 110 U. S. 742, 1884. But cases
may arise which fall without the statute: Fisk v. Union Pac.
Ry. Co., io Blatchf. (U. S.) 518, 1873; French v. Hay, 22
Wall. 250, 1874; Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kuteman, 54 FedRep. 547, 1892. So, though a state court generally will not
enjoin the prosecution of a suit in a federal court: Riggs v.
Johnson Co., 6 Wall. I66, 1867; U. S. v. Keokuk, 6 Wall. 514,
1867; Head v. Merritt, 2 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 402, 1831;
Schuyler v. Pellissier, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 191, 1838; Thompson v. Norris, 63 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 418, 1882; it may do soin
a proper case, and punish the offender for contempt, if he
persists: Hines v. Ransom, 4o Ga. 356, 1869.

In a recent case before the Court of Appeals of England,
Lamond v. Richard, [1897,] I Q. B. 541, the plaintiff sued to
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nnkeeper,
Guest,
Liability for

recover damages for unlawfuily ejecting her from

a hotel in which she was residing.

The facts

Election
were as follows: she came in November, 1895, to
the Hotel Metropole, at Brighton, of which the defendant was
the manager, and stayed there until August, 1896, paying her
board regularly. Her condition and conduct were not such
as to justify the defendant in refusing her accommodations.
On August 25, 1896, by order of, the directors of the corporation which owned the inn, the undermanager had an
interview with her, in which he asked her when she was
going to leave the hotel; and on her replying that she should
stay there as long as she liked, he gave her verbal notice that
her room must be at the manager's disposal by noon on
the 27th. She did not leave on that day; and on the 31st
she was told that she must leave, and that if she declined to
do so, her luggage would be packed up by the hotel servants.
In the afternoon she went out for a walk, and on her return
was refused admission.
Her things had been packed by
servants and brought down into the hall, whence they were
subsequently removed by the plaintiff There were vacant
rooms in the hotel at the time, and the plaintiff's room was
not required for the accommodation of other guests. On
these facts the court held, that the common law liability of an
innkeeper to receive and lodge a guest attaches only so long
as the guest is a traveler, and a person who has been received
at an inn as a traveler, does not necessarily continue to reside
there in that character; that it is a question of fact whether
the guest is still a traveler at any given time during his residence at the inn, and one of the ingredients for determining
this fact is the length of time that has elapsed since his
arrival ; and that if the guest has lost the character of traveler, the innkeeper is not bound to supply him with lodging;
but is entitled on giving reasonable notice to require him to
leave, and affirmed the judgment of the county court for the
defendant, on the ground that the hotel was a "common inn."

In Wffman v. Gay, 37 Atl. Rep. 325, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine lately held, that, exemption being a personal
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Insolvency,
Preference,
Exemption,
Waiver

privilege of the debtor, which may be waived by
him, it should be regarded as being waived when

he conveys the property to another; and therefore, if the conveyance is a fraudulent preference under the
insolvent laws, the assignee for the benefit of creditors may
recover the property or its value.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota has ruled that it cannot
be held, as matter of law, that because a technically insolvent
merchant or trader suffers an action to be comPreferences,
Judgment
menced against him upon a claim to which he
by Default
has no defence, by creditors who know him to be
technically insolvent, and allows a judgment to be entered and
docketed against him for want of an answer, which judgment
becomes a lien upon his real estate, that he intended to permit
the judgment creditors to obtain an unlawful preference:
Bean v. Scleffer, 7o N. W. Rep. 854.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided,
affirming 68 Fed. Rep. 247, that a vessel is in " collision,"
Insurance,
Particular
Average
Clause,

In collision

within the clause in a policy of marine insurance,
"free of particular average unless the vessel be
sunk, burned, stranded, or in collision," when,
after being completely loaded, and casting off her
moorings, she is made fast again to await the regu-

lation of some insignificant trouble about her machinery, and
is then run into by a scow, in tow of a tug, which makes a
substantial break in her iron bulwarks, though the injury is
not sufficient to impair her seaworthiness: London Assurance
v. Companhia de Moagens do Barreiro, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 785.
A verdict will be set aside when some of the jurors, during
the trial, took dinner at a restaurant with the sucJury,
Misconduct, cessful party, who invited them to do so, and paid
New Trial
for it: Marshallv. Watson, (Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas,) 4o S. W. Rep. 352.
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A court of equity has jurisdiction to appraise the rent to
become due under a lease for an ensuing part of the term,
Lease,
when an arbitration as to the amount of the rent,
Rental,
provided
for, has failed; and there is a failure of
Equity
Jurisdiction the arbitration, when one of two arbitrators, who
were empowered to select a third, was governed as to such
selection entirely by the wishes and instructions of one of the
parties, and, without any other reason, refused to agree to any
one of several competent and disinterested men proposed by
his associate: Grosvenor v. Flint, (Supreme Court of Rhode
Island,) 37 Atl. Rep. 304.

Since the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution is
entitled, if successful, to recover damages for the injury to his
Malicious
Prosecution,
Evidence

reputation, he may prove newspaper publications
containing plain accounts of the prosecution,
without comment thereon. "A plain, uncolored

statement of such proceedings in a newspaper is a privileged
publication, and not in itself a tort. Such a publication is a
natural and probable consequence, and a direct consequence
of the institution of the prosecution; and the fact that the
prosecution resulted in- such a publication may properly be
shown to aid the jury in estimating the damages:" Minneapolis Threshing-Machine Co. v. Regier, (Supreme Court of
Nebraska,) 70 N.W. Rep. 934.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has lately decided that
neither a divorce a mensa et thoro, with alimony, nor a settlement by her with an absconding husband of her
Married
Women,
claim for money under such divorce proceedings
Power to
Contract,

Divorcea

Mensa et

by accepting land in lieu of money, nor the fact
that she has been declared a feme sole trader,

will make her anything but a married woman in
respect of her contracts; nothing but an absolute divorce a
vinculo watrimoniiwill have that effect; and therefore a note
signed by a married woman, not so divorced, though the other
circumstances mentioned all exist, as surety for another, is
Thoro
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void, under the married women's acts of Pennsylvania: Harley
v. Leonard, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 43 1.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has adopted the rule which
seems consonant with reason and justice, that when a subsequent
grantee of mortgaged premises, in the conveyance
Assumption
to him, assumes the mortgage as part of the conof Debt by
sideration, his liability rests solely on that conGrantee

sideration and promise, and no other consideration
need pass from the mortgagee to the grantee, though his
immediate grantor was not personally liable to the mortgagee:
Enoi'v. Sanger, 7o N. W. Rep. io69.
When a mortgagor, by recorded deed, conveys part of the
mortgaged premises to one who assumes the entire mortgage
debt, and then conveys the balance, free from the
Transfer of
Property, incumbrance, the first parcel, even in the hands
Assumption
of Debt by
Grantee

of a subsequent grantee, who agrees to pay only
a proportionate part of the debt, is primarily liable

for the whole amount, and the mortgagee may first resort
thereto, reserving the balance of the tract as a separate fund
to satisfy a later indebtedness secured on that part alone:
Skinner v. Harker, (Supreme Court of Colorado,) 48 Pac.
Rep. 648.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Alabama, the rule that mortgaged premises will be subjected
Foreclosure,
to foreclosure in the inverse order of alienation
Inverse
by the mortgagor, does not apply when the
Order of
Alienation

b

t

mortgage provides that any part of the land sold by
the mortgagor shall be released on payment of the purchasemoney on the mortgage, and the mortgagor sells a part of
the premises to one who has notice of this provision, reserving
a lien for the deferred payments, and delivering the notes
therefor to the mortgagee. In such a case foreclosure should
first be had on lands so sold for the amount due on the notes
before resorting to that held by the mortgagor, or by a person
who succeeds to his equities: NMorthwestern Land Assni. v.
Robinson, 21 So. Rep. 999.
Ardemus Stewart.

